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Abstract This article has three objectives: First, it revises the history of the
reception of Ludwik Fleck’s monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wis-
senschaftlichen Tatsache (1935, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact).
Contrary to the established picture, Fleck’s book was largely discussed in the years
before the outbreak of World War II. What becomes clear when reading these early
reviews and especially Fleck’s comments to those written by representatives of Nazi
Germany is, second, the political dimension of his epistemology. In this respect,
Fleck’s emphasis on the genuinely democratic character of science will be discussed
in some detail. And third, Fleck’s notion of ‘‘Denkstil’’—thought-style—shall be
examined more closely since, as we will claim, it can be understood as a notion
indicating where the democratic dimension of science encounters its limits.
Keywords History of epistemology  Political epistemology  Democracy 
Thought-style
What times are these, when to speak of trees is almost a crime.
Bertold Brecht, To those who follow in our wake, Svendborg poems, 1939.
‘‘There were lively discussions when the book was published.’’1 This is a quote
from a curriculum vitae Ludwik Fleck himself wrote in German after 1957, and the
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book he refers to is no other than Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaft-
lichen Tatsache, published in Basel in 1935. Considering the established history of
reception of Ludwik Fleck’s epistemological thought and in particular of his book
of 1935, one cannot but deem this wording euphemistic. Isn’t it a fact that during
his lifetime Fleck was hardly noticed as a philosopher of science? And is it not
the case that the movement that recognises and discusses Ludwik Fleck not just as
an amateur medical historian but also as an authority in epistemology gained
momentum only decades after his death?
This traditional image, in some instances, has to be corrected or at least
complemented, as will be shown in the following.2 One has to admit that Fleck’s
book and his other writings—called by him ‘‘writings from the field of philosophy
of science’’—didn’t become part of the esoteric circle of books discussed by experts
in the field of epistemology during his lifetime. But this does not mean that they
passed totally unnoticed.
On the one hand and first of all, we have to mention the discussions—only
recently discovered, at least by the German-speaking world—Ludwik Fleck had
with the philosopher Izydora Da˛mbska in 1937 and with the medical historian
Tadeusz Bilikiewicz in 1939, published in the renowned Polish journal Przegla˛d
Filozoficzny.3 Both debates involved fundamental problems of and positions in
epistemology and were—especially on Fleck’s part—pursued with polemical verve.
The debate with Bilikiewicz, which focused on the relationship between science and
its environment, will be discussed in detail below.
On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned that about 20 reviews appeared when
his book Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (Genesis
and Development of a Scientific Fact) was published.4 In the curriculum vitae
already referred to, Fleck speaks of ‘‘Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland.’’ A
number of other reviews were published in England, Holland, Austria, Poland, and
in Scandinavia.
It is a fact that Fleck, in these journals and in the dailies too, was recognised
primarily as a medical historian and less acknowledged in the field of epistemol-
ogy.5 And just as it was a certain Gue´rard de Laurieres, and not e.g. Gaston
Bachelard, who reviewed the book for the French-speaking world, the authors of the
two reviews published in Austria probably did not belong to the Vienna Circle or its
Footnote 1 continued
(Archives of Contemporary History) of ETH Zurich that can be visited online too: http://www.
ludwikfleck.ethz.ch/de/fleck-archive/online-archiv.html. For this case AfZ FD Thomas Schnelle/1.1.
2 Borck (2004) in particular, has drawn attention to this fact.
3 Cf. in particular Zittel (2007), Sauerland (2007), as well as Griesecke & Graf (2008), in particular
Griesecke (2008a, b). An English translation of the debate with Bilikiewicz is available in Lo¨wy (1990),
249–275.
4 See Borck 2004, 453 f., Zittel 2007, as well as Schnelle 1982, 78 and 341.
5 One exception is the review by Leon Chwistek (1936) published in Poland. In his introduction he
writes: ‘‘This book belongs to the fields of methodology and epistemology and I do not exaggerate in
declaring a turning point/milestone in the history of these sciences that are still very dark and full of
archaic superstition.’’
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environs.6 Still, what we can gather from these contemporary reviews is not simply
irrelevant or just an—historical—oddity. In particular the reviews published in
Germany are informative and worth considering, as a closer look at two of them
shows. The most extensive, published in 1936, was written by Hans Petersen, an
anatomist from Wu¨rzburg. As the author himself mentioned in the beginning of his
review, it appeared in the same weekly, the Klinische Wochenzeitschrift, that had
published Fleck’s essay ‘‘On the fundamental principles of medical knowledge’’
(‘‘Zur Frage der Grundlegung der medizinischen Erkenntnis’’) one year earlier. In
his paper spanning several pages, Petersen, in part, critically reviewed Fleck’s book
and argumentation. Besides some reservations, e.g. one concerning Fleck’s notion
of a thought-collective rather than thought-community (Gemeinschaft)—as a result
of which he situated Fleck closer to the Russian concept of social life than to the
German—there are passages full of acclaim like the following in which Petersen
shows great interest in Fleck’s notion of ‘‘thought-style.’’ Fleck, according to
Petersen, conceives ‘‘the history of medical thought as one link in a general cultural
movement’’ and shows that it ‘‘complies with this ‘style of thought’ and, thus, with
the historical situation and culture.’’ Petersen continues:
In a slightly disturbing move, not expected from this quarter, Fleck joins
our new German ‘thought-style’ which denies the existence of an ‘absolute’
science without presuppositions and views it instead as always being part of a
cultural totality. Science shares its presuppositions and commitments with the
living conditions of its cultural context (Petersen 1936, 239).7
At least just as positive, if not still more enthusiastic, is a review, also published
in 1936, in the Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie, the staff of which was closely connected
with the Humboldt University in Berlin. Fleck’s undertaking is characterized as an
‘‘interesting task’’ and its author is said to have ‘‘a remarkably thorough grasp
[Griffsicherheit].’’ The conclusion of the rather short review reads as follows:
All in all, a prolific approach that does away with the so-called impartiality of
scientific thought more thoroughly than general epistemology can, and that, by
elucidating scientific thought in its historical and social conditionality, makes
suggestions how to deal with other scientific problems in historical case
studies, a task that might be fruitful for psychology and epistemology,
particularly if the racial determination of a thought-style is taken into account
(Kroh 1936, 164).
The commentator who emphasized the possible future inclusion of ‘‘racial
determination’’ in the concept of a ‘‘thought-style’’ was Oswald Kroh (1934), a
6 Besides the review published by a certain ‘‘– – –el’’ in 1936 in the Wiener klinischen Wochenschrift
mention should be made of a paper published in Natur und Kultur. Monatsschrift fu¨r Naturforschung und
Kulturpflege, published in Vienna, Innsbruck, and Vienna. It considers Fleck’s book ‘‘of the highest
value’’ and deplores ‘‘that many physicians unfortunately will not be able to follow the lines of thought
because of a lack of philosophical education.’’ This second paper is not signed. The publisher of this
journal was a certain Dr. Franz Wetzl in Munich (Mu¨nchen-Solln) whose publishing company Herold
also published a journal for dowsing-rod research, the Zeitschrift fu¨r Wu¨nschelruten-Forschung.
7 English translation quoted from Borck 2004, 454 f., slightly adapted.
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psychologist, who, thanks to the publication of his work Vo¨lkische Anthropologie
als Grundlage deutscher Erziehung in 1934, was soon to be appointed Spartenleiter
(‘‘section leader’’) of the NS-project ‘‘Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften’’
(‘‘Mission of war of the humanities’’) and who, in 1945, was dismissed as Professor
of Philosophy and Head of the Institute of Psychology at Berlin University.
Ludwik Fleck, as we know, took notice of these reviews and the way in which his
‘‘teaching of thought-style and thought-collective’’ was appropriated. He responded
to this political usurpation of his thinking partly within the framework of the
discussions mentioned above, in 1939, with the Polish psychiatrist and medical
historian Tadeusz Bilikiewicz. The starting point of these discussions was Fleck’s—
late—response to a study of Bilikiewicz published in 1932 by Thieme in Leipzig,
Die Embryologie im Zeitalter des Barock und Rokoko (Embryology during the
Baroque and Rococo). In the related discussion concerning the question how the
social and cultural environment determines the way in which research—including
its findings—can be carried out, we put special emphasis on the following passage,
in which Fleck talks about the ‘‘pointless phrases about the non-existence of
‘voraussetzungslose Wissenschaft’ (presuppositionless science).’’8 Since he puts
this phrase in quotation marks and, what’s more, in German, this can be seen as a
direct reference to the reviews of Kroh and Petersen. And with the following
passage at the latest, it becomes clear that Fleck’s essay was not simply one more
paper contributing to the learned discussions of medical historians. In this case he
unambiguously writes about the contemporary background of this discussion
concerning ‘‘the dependency of science on epoch and environment.’’
The sociological, collective nature of knowledge was first turned into a
political slogan involving the social and class conditioning of science, and
then the competing political trends created the spirit of a nation and the race
to provide a mythical world-view propagated through the ages (Fleck 1990
[1939], 250).
The topics Fleck turned to in his epistemological deliberations were not solely
limited to matters of the academic world. The reception of Fleck’s ‘‘writings from
the field of philosophy of science’’ by his contemporaries was intended to show this,
a fact of which he was clearly aware. He emphasised the political context in which
his discussions with Bilikiewicz took place by talking about the ‘‘present turbulent
times.’’ It is against this background that one has to consider Fleck’s repeated
references, between 1929 and 1939, to the genuinely democratic character of the
‘‘thinking which is typical of the natural sciences.’’
He underscored his opinion most extensively in his essay ‘‘On the crises of
‘reality’’’ published in the journal Die Naturwissenschaften in the year 1929. The
fact that it was the first theoretical essay he wrote in German, the essay with which
he entered the epistemological scene, makes it even more noteworthy. The
following line from the article was italicized by the author himself: ‘‘Natural
8 The Polish original reads as follows: ‘‘[…] a nie _zro´dłem płytkich frazeso´w o nieistnieniu
‘voraussetzungslosen Wissenschaft’ lub sme˛tnych refleksji o ‘niepewnos´ci wielkiej ludzkiej wiedzy’’’
(Fleck 2007, 265).
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science is the art of shaping a democratic reality and being directed by it—thus
being reshaped by it’’ (Fleck 1986a [1929], 50).9
The democratic way of thinking—particularly—of the natural sciences comes
from and was developed, as Fleck explains earlier, ‘‘among the artisans, the seamen,
the barber-surgeons, the leatherworkers and saddlers, the gardeners and probably
also among children playing.’’ Since ‘‘wherever serious or playful work was done
by many, where common or opposite interests met repeatedly, this uniquely
democratic way of thinking was indispensable.’’ And he continues:
I am calling the thinking which is typical of the natural sciences democratic,
because it is based upon organization and control at all times, it rejects the
privilege of divine origin and wants to be accessible and useful to everybody
(Fleck 1986a [1929], 50).
A comparable characterisation distinguishing the ‘‘thinking which is typical for
the natural sciences’’ from hierarchically organised religious thought collectives and
is, thus, ‘‘democratic’’ can be found in Fleck’s essay ‘‘The Problem of Epistemol-
ogy’’ published in 1936 in Polish (‘‘Zagadnienie teorii poznawania’’):
The modern scientific thought-collective ought to be called democratic: the
criterion of truth is found—at least in principle—in the ‘general public’, i.e. in
the mass [‘general verifiability’] and not in the e´lite, which clearly stresses that
it serves the ‘general public’. There are no secret powers, one cannot refer to a
mission obtained from upper circles; every epistemological act should be
derived from universal powers, i.e. powers to which everybody is entitled, and
from general adopted formulae’’ (Fleck 1986c [1936], 105).10
One can hardly emphasise more clearly the contrast with the ideology and
organisational form of authoritarian institutions or apparatuses. And the same essay
reveals how alarmed Fleck was by the markedly advanced attempts—on both
sides—to exploit the sciences politically, since he points out that it was the
‘‘democratic system [‘ustro´j’ in Polish, meaning ‘form of government’] of the
scientific thought-collective, developed for good only in the 19th century with
which our present-day thought-style stands and falls’’ (Fleck 1986c [1936], 105).
Thus, if Fleck calls the system of the sciences democratic, this certainly does not
mean that some voting procedure would determine the truth of a scientific finding.11
And if Fleck underscores the democratic character of ‘‘the scientific thought-style,’’
it is not just because he is an apprehensive citizen but because, as he wrote in his
book of 1935, he is convinced that ‘‘the postulate ‘to maximize experience’ is the
9 Originally ‘‘Zur Krise der ‘Wirklichkeit’.’’
10 Originally ‘‘Zagadnienie teorii poznawania.’’
11 Fleck’s characterisation of the sciences as being democratically constituted is in line with the
deliberations of the literary critic and pedagogue Richard Wagner and of the philosopher of science Edgar
Zilsel, in Vienna, in the mid-twenties. As Monika Wulz shows in her as yet unpublished study, ‘‘Talking
about Democracy in the Philosophy of Science: The 1920s in Vienna,’’ both Wagner and Zilsel discussed
the existence of procedures to control the aims and assumptions of a statement and to critically reflect the
preconditions of its validity. Fleck may have been familiar with the work of Wagner and Zilsel, but—as
far as I know—he makes no reference to them.
‘‘… the art of shaping a democratic reality and being directed by it …’’ 85
123
supreme law of scientific thinking,’’ (Fleck 1979 [1935], 51) and that solely a
democratic form of organisation with its constitutive openness would guarantee the
adherence to this postulate. In a footnote toward the end of the book he avers:
This postulate concerning a maximum of information [Kenntnisse, jf] must be
separately stressed, because it is an outstanding characteristic of the thought
style of modern natural science. It can be formulated as follows: ‘No System
of knowledge [eines Wissens]—for example, about a chemical compound or a
biological species—must be regarded as closed in such a fashion that possible
new findings might be rejected as superfluous’. To assess the difference,
compare the diametrically opposed position of a dogmatic knowledge that
is regarded as completed. That is also a democratic trait of the thought style
of natural science, which denies previous knowledge any preferential or
privileged status above that of new knowledge’’ (Fleck 1979 [1935], 182n28,
translation adapted).
It is not surprising that the reviews by Kroh and his colleagues did not mention
Fleck’s characterisation of and deliberations on the democratic system of the
modern scientific thought-collective. They had to be ignored in order to talk about
Fleck’s closeness to a ‘new German ‘thought-style’. As Schnelle and Scha¨fer (1980,
viii) wrote in 1980 in their introduction to the German reprint of Genesis and
Development of a Scientific Fact, the ‘‘Polish Jew Fleck […] could not find broad
interest in Nazi-Germany.’’ This is certainly correct. And after having read the
reviews one would like to add: the Germanization of the first name12 was obviously
insufficient for the attempted usurpation. Fleck’s political thinking was by far too
reflective for that.
This would be an elegant, almost exemplary, conclusion, but this reading or
interpretation definitely falls short. It was not only in Germany and not only among
Nazis that Fleck’s references to the ‘‘democratic system of the scientific thought-
collective’’ did not find interest. They weren’t taken up at all, at least not to my
knowledge.
As far as I know, the three texts quoted remained the only ones written by Fleck
in which he explicitly points out the ‘‘democratic trait of the thought-style of natural
science.’’ Already in the article published in 1939 the expression ‘‘democratic’’ is
left out, nor is it found in his texts written after the war, not even in the essay—or
manifesto?—‘‘Crisis in Science. Toward a Free and More Human Science’’ that was
written in Israel and remained unpublished during his lifetime.13 One cannot help
noticing however that these later texts also have strong political accents. Especially
the one just quoted, which is a forceful warning, in particular, to scientists of the
12 In the reviews published in Germany, without exception, Fleck’s first name was spelled with a ‘g’.
13 However, one has to mention here Fleck’s comment to Tadeusz Tomaszewski’s talk on the
‘‘Psychological Studies on E-Prisoners of concentration Camps,’’ as recorded in the 1948 proceedings
of the Lublin Philosophical-Psychological Society. He states: ‘‘It is important to educate people in the
spirit of true democratic equality. We should develop efficient ways to resist propaganda that negates this
fundamental principle as well as approaches (means) that prevent infiltration of such propaganda’’ Quoted
from Leszczyn´ska 2009, 31.
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dangers inherent in propaganda, and clearly builds on the position Fleck held in the
1930s.
Still, or all the more, it has to be noticed that the expression ‘‘democratic’’ is left
out. Did Fleck retract his earlier views? Had Fleck lost his faith or confidence in
the democratic functioning/system of the actually existing sciences? Were the
differences between ideal and reality—reality as Fleck had experienced it during
WWI as a medical officer in the reserve of the austro-hungarian army, or in the
Lemberg ghetto, or as prisoner in Auschwitz and Buchenwald, or during his post-
war years in Poland, up to the time when he was employed at the Israel Institute
of Biological Research in Ness Ziona—too great? Considering the historic events,
all the turning points in the history of civilization that shaped his biography, the
political catastrophes Fleck had to live through, one could easily interpret it that
way.
A closer look at the texts under discussion here, dating from 1929 to 1939,
discussed, suggests the possibility of broader and different interpretations. Apart
from the passages already cited emphasizing the ‘‘democratic system of the
scientific thought-style’’ one can detect a number of passages dealing with or
investigating the concept of ‘‘thought-style’’ in a way that is contrary to this concept
of the democratic system of the sciences or at least modifies if not curtails it. It
would need another paper to investigate systematically the constitutive ambivalence
inherent in Fleck’s deliberations concerning the notion or concept of ‘‘thought-
style.’’ I would like to give a small example here, from the book published in 1935:
Because it belongs to a community, the thought style of the collective
undergoes social reinforcement […]. Such reinforcement is a feature of all
social structures. The thought style is subject to independent development for
generations. It constrains the individual by determining ‘what can be thought
in no other way’. Whole eras will then be ruled by this thought constraint.
Heretics who do not share this collective mood and are rated as criminals by
the collective will be burned at the stake until a different mood creates a
different thought style and different valuation (Fleck 1979 [1935], 99).
The thought-style as defined by Fleck, in this instance, ‘‘as directed perception
with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so
perceived’’ and ‘‘as a readiness for directed perception,’’ (Fleck 1979 [1935], 99
and 144, emphasis added) exerts a certain—if not necessarily striking—force. It
determines or ‘‘dictates,’’ as he writes in an essay also published in 1935, ‘‘what and
how’’ the members of a community ‘‘do see’’ (Fleck 1986b [1935], 72)14 and, thus,
concerns the democratic system as explained above, which topics are dealt with
and which not. Since Fleck, in this connection, chooses the expression ‘‘heretics will
be burned at the stake’’ or, to give another example, this time from his essay ‘‘The
Problem of Epistemology,’’ the phrase ‘‘the evil spell of doggedness with which
fanatics of their own style fight the people of a different style,’’ (Fleck 1986c [1936],
112) one cannot doubt that political implications and consequences were included in
14 The original in Polish was published under the title ‘‘O obserwacji naukowej i postrzeganiu w ogo´le’’
in Przegla˛d Filozoficzny.
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his deliberations on the problem of scientific knowledge, respectively that this can
be read as a—his basic—political theory of scientific knowledge. His formulations,
at least, can be interpreted as an invitation to read them in this way.
The fact that in the writings he published after 1936, with regard to the modern
scientific thought-collective, he left out the concept of democracy does not have
to mean that Fleck thereafter denied the political dimension of his epistemology or
disregarded the challenges science and society were faced with. Cornelius Borck
(2004, 462) called Fleck’s epistemological writings, especially with regard to their
political content, a ‘‘message in a bottle’’ (in his article published in 2004 with
exactly that title). As Borck convincingly showed, one characteristic of the political
traits of Fleck’s thinking lies in the surprising phrases, the formulations he used,
subtly hinting, between the lines, at the difficulties in spite of which those texts were
written. In his essay, published in Poland only one year after the war, ‘‘Problemy
naukoznawstwa’’—‘‘Problems of the science of science’’ in the English translation
by Richard S. Cohen and Thomas Schnelle—Fleck has one of the two characters
discussing fundamental epistemological questions say the following:
[…] in practice—as we learn from observation—there exists, for every
scientific worker, or, better still, for every collective body of workers—as
these are collective matters—a characteristic moment at which the worker or
the collective body assumes that no further verification is required. The
opinion becomes rounded, systematized, limited, in short it becomes mature
and obtains its form which is consistent with the thought-style of the given
collective. The collective body considers that any further questions are
superfluous, simply indecent. Some things must not be asked of the members
of religious, political or scientific collectives (Fleck 1986d [1946], 122).
It is part of an acknowledged thought-style that ‘‘some things’’ no longer have to
be discussed. All members of this thought-collective are cognizant of them but they
don’t have to be discussed once—or over and over—again. Yet, as Fleck was to
experience himself, one always has to be aware that something one needn’t discuss
any longer might turn into something that must not be discussed or questioned any
longer. Thus, which topics the sciences focus on and how they pursue them never
should be seen as a purely scientific question.
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